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The Everyday Local State? Opening up and closing down informality in local 
governance 
 




In the UK the combination of deficit reduction pursued by national governments since 2010 
and the policy agenda of localism has led to the concept of ‘austerity localism’, or the 
political agenda of framing the local as a site of social responsibility and civic engagement to 
support further neoliberal reforms and fiscal retrenchment (Featherstone et al. 2012, 177).  It 
is characterised by local government funding cuts, reduced public service provision, and the 
promotion of citizen self-provision of (formerly public) services.  Local government is thus 
both ‘site and target’ (Ward et al. 2015, 444), seeking to foster local responses amongst 
citizens and third sector organisations (TSOs) whilst passing down ongoing cuts imposed by 
central government.  In England, the budget of the central government department that 
allocates local government revenue funding underwent estimated real terms funding cuts of 
nearly 40% between 2011 and 2015 (Beatty and Fothergill 2014).    
 
Debates about how local governance is changing as a result are illuminated by considering 
state and civil society practices and how they relate, using the lens of informality.  Drawing 
from phased research comprising interviews and documentary review in a case study local 
government area, we consider how the governance of informal practice and the everyday 
local state develops under austerity by considering informality as both a top-down 
(government-instigated) and bottom-up (civil society-instigated) process.  We find that both 
local government and civil society actors got better at instigating and responding to 
informality and navigating its contradictions under austerity, underlining the mutually 
constitutive nature of state and civil society in the operations of the ‘everyday local state’ 
(after Hilbrandt, 2019) and the importance of boundary spanning practices and individuals in 
realising this.  But over time we find that the ongoing strictures of funding cuts are closing 
down informality and constraining the creativity that has been engendered, as the local state 
centralises in response.  Our case of Cardiff, Wales adds to understandings of austerity 
localism which have focused on the experience in English local authorities (for example, 
2 
 
Lowndes and McCaughie, 2013; Penny 2017) and is of international relevance in considering 
everyday, local ways of coping with austerity (Davies and Blanco 2017; Davies 2017).  
  
The article proceeds as follows.  We first explain the usefulness of considering practice to 
understand changes in local governance as austerity discourses are introduced onto the policy 
agenda.  We then explain our approach to informal practice as a top-down as well as bottom-
up process and set out the four-model framework used in our analysis.  Following an 
explanation of the research approach and case background, we then present our findings and 
analysis of how informal practice is reshaping local governance in three realms of community 
service delivery (via asset transfer, co-production and service commissioning).  We conclude 
by considering what is revealed about the progress and effects of austerity localism on local 
state-society relations and the broader implications of our research approach.  
 
Understanding through practice   
 
Debates about governance under austerity localism range from the potentially empowering 
effects of local action, evidenced by the wide-ranging literature on co-production and 
collaborative governance, to its interpretation as the neoliberal expression of state power, 
described as ‘austerian realism’ or the realpolitik imposition of cuts due to the perceived lack 
of alternatives (Davies and Blanco 2017, 1524).  Accounts that emphasise empowerment are 
criticised for being too optimistic about bottom-up agency, neglecting structural factors and 
power imbalances (Williams, Goodwin, and Cloke 2014).  Those which emphasise the 
imposition of neoliberalism are critiqued for being overly pessimistic about citizen agency 
and disregarding the variegated forms of local governance that result (Brenner, Peck, and 
Theodore 2010).   
 
Considering practice helps to circumnavigate these debates about agency.  We focus on 
informal practice and how local government and civil society actors instigate and respond to 
informality over time.  To set this in context, previous critical policy and new institutionalist 
studies have deployed relational concepts such as assemblages (Janet Newman, 2014) and 
institutional bricolage (Lowndes and McCaughie 2013) to consider practice under austerity.  
These find hope in ‘an active politics of the present’ (Lowndes and McCaughie 2013, 546) 
expressed in context-contingent, creative responses.  In their case study of an English (city) 
local authority, Lowndes and McCaughie (2013, 533) found that practices fell between the 
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extremes of ‘trimming’ (responding in an ad hoc way to cuts) and ‘transformation’ (strategic 
innovation), concluding that local government has a ‘remarkable capacity to reinvent its 
institutional forms’.  Political geography scholarship has engaged in debates about the 
‘prosaic state’ of everyday state-society relations (Painter 2006).  In contrast, the rich urban 
geography literature about everyday (informal, do-it-yourself, temporary) urbanisms tends 
not to consider local government’s role, presumed to be absent from the peripheral sites 
housing marginal populations where research has focused (Hilbrandt 2019, 353).  This 
scholarship emphasises the possibilities for urban activism (Mayer 2013) with its focus on 
‘minor practices, small acts… that create material spaces of hope’ (Tonkiss 2013, 323).  
Disciplines share recognition of the importance of everyday actions, which comprise the first 
principle of practice theory (Feldman and Worline 2016, 310).  The second principle, of 
mutual constitution, emphasises the importance of practices which (and individuals who) can 




Our approach to informal practice encompasses the role of both state and civil society actors, 
thus refining the general association made in public policy scholarship of the state with ‘the 
formal’ and consequently with formal institutions, and citizen or community activity with 
‘the informal’.  Focusing on central-local state relations, recent research in England into the 
devolution of responsibilities from central government to groupings of local authorities 
recognises the importance of state-engendered informality (Ayres 2017; Lowndes and 
Lemprière 2018).  In considering informal governance, or a ‘means of decision-making that 
is uncodified, non-institutional and where social relationships play crucial roles’, Ayres 
(2017, 90) finds that highly-skilled boundary spanners, linked by informal relationships and 
able to translate agreements into practice, play a critical role.  Taking a new institutionalist 
approach, which has long recognised the importance of informal aspects of institutional 
regimes, Lowndes and Lemprière (2018, 237) stress the importance of informal practices of 
collaboration or competition in the formation of local authority groupings.  But these 
approaches do not explicitly relate to the promotion of civil society activity under austerity 
localism.  In turn, urban geography scholarship has largely bypassed the role of the state in 




In order to address our core question of how the governance of informal practice and the 
everyday local state develops under austerity, we therefore draw from Tonkiss’ (2013; 2014) 
more holistic approach to informality and the everyday practice of local governance, which 
encompasses the local state in simultaneous interaction with civil society actors.  The 
approach considers informality as both a top-down (local government-instigated) as well as 
bottom-up (civil society-instigated) process, important given the accentuation of informality 
under austerity localism as local government seeks to offload responsibilities to communities 
(Peck 2012).  That informality is engendered by the state as well as civil society actors 
reiterates practice theory’s emphasis on mutual constitution (Feldman and Worline 2016, 
310).  Formality and informality are also mutually constitutive – informality ‘is not “outside” 
formal systems, but… is always intimately related to them’ (Porter 2011, 116) – and both 
produce ‘everyday lived experience’ (Iveson et al. 2018, 4).  In the ‘everyday local state’ 
(Hilbrandt 2019), everyday practices shape the state.  Taking a civil society perspective in 
considering how people negotiate with state agents (such as street-level bureaucracies), 
interpret the law or engage with peers to gain ‘room for manoeuvre’ (2019, 353), Hilbrandt 
concludes that people co-construct the local state by mediating its regulatory frames.  She 
reiterates the importance of boundary spanning by underlining the false dichotomy drawn 
between state and society which disregards overlying networks of practice.   
 
In general terms, informality is typically used to denote activities that do not conform to 
existing legal regulations.  As a concept, informality is contested depending on disciplinary 
perspective. Understanding informality requires an appreciation of its inherent ambiguities 
and contradictions, described by Roy (2009, 9) as the ‘grayness… between legality and 
illegality, the recognised and the criminalised, the included and the marginalised’.  Tonkiss 
defines it not in terms of legality, but as a concept which encapsulates less formality, or anti-
formality, whether or not these practices are regulated by legal rules and whether or not they 
are endured (collectively expected) (Tonkiss 2014, 93).  Tonkiss’ conceptualisation contrasts 
with that of new institutionalism, wherein institutions can be either formal or informal as long 
as they comprise rules (or norms) with an enforcer - in contrast to practice, which can in turn 
become institutionalised if rules (or norms) and an enforcer emerge (Lowndes and Roberts 
2013).  Drawing from Tonkiss, here we define informality as practice in its non-
institutionalised form, which as yet is not formally, legally regulated and consequently is not 
necessarily enforced.  This definition is pertinent to our phased analysis because it focuses on 
the liminal periods where everyday practice is either endured (collectively expected) or not, 
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and whether a practice begins to be sanctioned through legal rules or societal norms or not.  
These periods of liminal transition are important to our focus through phased research on the 
shifts wrought under austerity localism – and how these open up and close down 
opportunities for informal practice.  
 
Models of Local State Responses to Informality 
We deploy Tonkiss’ (2013, 313-14) four models of local state stances towards or responses to 
informality under austerity.  We describe her first two models, under which informality is 
enabled or allowed respectively, as ‘informality from above’ as they are engendered by the 
local state.   The third and fourth models, under which informality is proscribed or the local 
state withdraws, comprise local state responses to what we term ‘informality from below’ as 
these are engendered by citizens, community groups or TSOs.   Taking each of Tonkiss’ 
models in turn, the first is a positive model where local governments use the powers available 
to create the conditions for informal agencies, such as making asset transfers to community 
management/ ownership.  The second is a permissive model that does not seek to facilitate 
such agencies, but does not exclude them (whether for ideological reasons or due to 
regulatory incapacity).  These ‘top-down informality’ models contrast with the third, a 
proscription model that precludes bottom-up informalities by constraining negotiation, 
improvisation, and initiative, such as through the criminalisation of squatting.  The fourth is 
an abandonment model in which ‘urban territory is ceded to independent agency’, leaving 
even very basic forms of provision to self-generation and social effort. The last resort of such 
‘extreme economy’ is evident in some US cities where austerity is normalised (Davies and 
Pill 2012; Peck 2012, 626).  Whilst the models can be readily critiqued for being too neat or 
distinct when in actuality they can co-exist simultaneously within and across different spaces 
and policy realms, as an analytical frame they provide us with a way of identifying transitions 
in practice over relatively short periods of time riven with uncertainty, thus providing a useful 
heuristic to understand changes in state-society relations as austerity localism progresses.  In 
turn, to understand practice we need to be mindful of the inherent contradictions and 
ambiguities of informality (Roy 2009).  Two contradictions identified by Tonkiss (2014) help 
problematise our analysis: that between self-help and abandonment; and between temporary 
use and insecurity.  ‘Self-help’ refers to the state capitalising on informal networks of social 
and welfare provision that can provide services beyond or instead of the under-resourced or 
retreating state (Tonkiss 2014, 103).  The contradiction is that the more the community is 
engaged in service provision, the less state provision is required.  Informality is also 
6 
 
expressed in temporary uses increasingly encouraged by the local state as a policy tool to 
reactivate and protect spaces (via pop-ups and meanwhile uses) in the interim before more 
valuable uses emerge (Deslandes 2013).  This contradiction is relevant given the ways in 
which, and on what terms, the local state seeks to transfer, or community/ third sector actors 




To consider how the governance of informal practice and the everyday local state develops 
under austerity we consider informality as both a top-down (government-instigated) and 
bottom-up (civil society-instigated) process.  Prior austerity localism scholarship has selected 
individual local authority areas for detailed case research, which can be considered 
appropriate as these areas form both its ‘site and target’ (Ward et al. 2015, 444).  Our 
selection of Cardiff adds a Welsh case to those focused on English (urban) local authorities 
(such as Lowndes and McCaughie 2013; Penny 2017).  Our approach is also distinguished by 
its three research phases which enable us to consider the progress of austerity localism in the 
city and the implications for informal practice.  
 
Tonkiss’ four models and associated contradictions provide a useful framework for the 
analysis, through which we identify the mix of models in operation to illuminate whether and 
how the local state has sought to engender (top-down) and responded to (bottom-up) 
community-based informal practice.  In drawing out informality from above and below, the 
approach enables consideration of how, in its interactions, the local state contributes to 
informality and the creation of the everyday local state to cope with austerity.  We consider 
the roles and relations between citizens, councillors, Cabinet members and local government 
officers.  We especially focus on the TSO officers described in previous research as ‘hybrid 
officers’ due to their community-based organisations becoming hybrids (between the third 
and public sector) as the organisations become enrolled in provision of (formerly public) 
services offloaded under austerity (Pill and Guarneros-Meza 2018; Skelcher and Smith 2015). 
In contrast to Ayres’ (2017) examination of boundary spanners across tiers of government, 
we use the concept to underline the role of hybrid officers spanning between the state and 
civil society, who take risks and are creative in their attempts to reconcile informal and 
formal practices (which stem from the state and their communities) as part of efforts to cope 
with austerity.     
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Our analysis draws from a combination of documentary review of policy reports and 
qualitative research conducted in two principal phases (spring/ summer 2014; and spring 
2015) and a subsidiary phase (winter 2017).  A total of 31 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted, fifteen in the first phase, fourteen in the second and two in the third.  Given repeat 
interviews with some respondents across the phases, a total of 23 respondents were 
interviewed: a Welsh government assembly member; a senior Welsh government officer; 
four city councillors (including two Cabinet members); three senior city government officers, 
including the ‘network manager’ responsible for the Cardiff Partnership and CF clusters 
(explained below); ten TSO officers, of which five were neighbourhood-based; and four 
citizen activists.  Six respondents (two councillors, the network manager, two TSO officers 
and a citizen activist) were interviewed in both the first and second phases; and the same two 
TSO officers were interviewed for a third time in December 2017 to gain a sector-specific 
update augmented by further substantive documentary review. Such analysis is a useful 
resource to inform understanding of future practice, given the mutual constitution of 
formality and informality.  
 
Interviews were recorded, fully transcribed and coded to surface the nature of and attitudes 
towards informal and formal practices in community service provision, using Tonkiss’ 
models of informality as a framework for analysis (summarised in Table 1).  Community 
services are non-statutory services which meet community social needs, such as the 
maintenance and management of community centres; play and youth service provision; and 
employment support services.  Community service delivery practice is mediated by the 
Council and TSOs in three realms addressed in turn in our analysis of informal practice - 
community asset transfer, citizen engagement in service co-production, and service 
commissioning.   
 
Cardiff 
Cardiff (population 361,000) is the capital of Wales.  Welsh local governments share many 
experiences with their English counterparts due to the extent of UK government funding cuts, 
but these are also shaped by some distinctive Welsh Government policies, including which 
public services are protected; policies and new legislation about collaboration; and continued 
emphasis on poverty reduction.  In Wales, cuts to local government grants are ongoing year-
on-year though these have not been as severe as in England (Ogle, Luchinskaya, and Trickey 
2017, 10).  The Welsh Government has protected spending on health, schools and social 
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services, meaning that other, non-statutory services (environmental, planning, culture, 
libraries, sports, childcare and youth provision) have faced the brunt.  Cardiff Council had a 
£100 million funding gap for the three-year period to March 2017 (Cardiff Council 2013a) 
and a similar shortfall for the following three years to March 2020 (Cardiff Council 2016).  
The Council has ‘made £200m in savings over the past ten years’ and has ‘lost 1,600 full time 
employees over the past five years’ (Cardiff Council 2016).  In addition to cuts, its repertoire 
has included increasing Council Tax to ‘enable us to continue to finance some of the non-
statutory services residents want’ (Cardiff Council 2017a), increasing online ‘self-service’, 
and an annual citizen consultation on budget priorities (the ‘Cardiff Debate’).  As in many 
English cities, the Council adapted its city-wide partnership of service providers to co-
ordinate cuts, leverage resources and offload service delivery.  It sought to rationalise and 
join-up service provision through creating multi-service ‘community hubs’ (combining the 
local library, housing office and other services) and developed partnerships with major third 
sector entities (such as the YMCA) to deliver leisure centre services. With the rise of the self-
help imperative as non-statutory community services were cut, existing cross-service 
neighbourhood partnerships were tasked with co-ordinating their work with the efforts of 
neighbourhood-based TSOs and informal community groups (Cardiff Council 2013b).    
Policy document discourse emphasised the need for communities to ‘step up’ to manage 
formerly public assets and engage in service provision (Cardiff Partnership 2016).   
 
Distinctive to Wales was retention of its national tackling poverty initiative, Communities 
First (CF).  In Cardiff, the Council contracted neighbourhood-based TSOs to manage its four 
CF clusters.  In England, cessation of such spatially-targeted initiatives was compounded by 
the removal of a national framework of minimum standards, and the localism agenda was 
presented as empowering localities to determine their own priorities.  Wales has continued to 
prioritise redressing socio-spatial inequality. The Well-being of Future Generations Act 
(Welsh Government 2015a) affirmed the role of local collaboration.  Local partnerships were 
tasked with creating local well-being plans, expected to align with poverty reduction goals by 
targeting service improvements in the most deprived communities.  Alignment is expedient 
as the CF initiative ceased in March 2018 with significant repercussions for its third sector 








Community Asset Transfer 
 
Community asset transfer exemplifies the positive model of the local state’s response to 
informality, wherein local government uses its powers to create the conditions for informal 
agencies.  But an examination of practice in Cardiff illustrates the complexities of the 
interplays between informality from above and below in this realm.  The community ‘right to 
bid’ for designated community assets enshrined in the Localism Act (2011) applies only in 
England.  Welsh Government, in describing asset transfer as ‘present[ing] opportunities for 
the community to own and manage facilities that might otherwise be closed down because the 
local authority is unable to subsidise them any longer’ (Welsh Government 2015b) clearly 
locates the approach as part of the local state’s response to austerity.   But it had yet to 
develop policies in this regard.  In first phase interviews, a Welsh Government senior officer 
commented that in England, ‘it isn't a simple case of that [right] came in and everything 
followed in an obvious order, and the communities are now running pubs and shops and 
libraries’.   Local and Welsh state interviewees underscored the challenge of implementation, 
such as the need to map community assets and, as the senior officer commented, ‘the huge 
governance, financial issues coming down the line’.  Welsh local councils were thus left to 
proceed with developing their own approaches.   
 
The Council’s network manager explained the Cardiff Debate process had ‘demonstrated 
there’s actually a huge amount of community appetite and interest out there…  we’ve been 
quite blatant and said all these buildings are potentially up for community asset transfer’.  By 
the research second phase, the Cardiff Partnership’s ‘Stepping Up’ toolkit (first version 2015) 
sought to provide guidance to communities on how to do so.  The Council’s network manager 
saw it as ‘hugely complex and a massive challenge’ which ‘everyone’s expecting to be 
chaos’.  The Council was seeking initial business plans from groups as a ‘screening process’, 
and had identified some resource to support subsequent development (such as funding for 
legal advice).  From a bottom-up perspective, TSOs identified asset transfer as a realm in 
which greater informality on the part of the Council - such as lighter regulation and higher 
tolerance of risk - was not yet evident.  One described ‘push[ing] quite hard to try and get a 
community asset transfer for the library [about to be replaced by a community hub at another 




The asset transfers which had gone ahead aligned with the permissive rather than positive 
model, under which local government does not seek to facilitate but does not exclude 
informal agencies.  A neighbourhood-based TSO officer explained how the TSO had 
occupied vacant, Council-owned premises, thus demonstrating informal, everyday agency:  
 ‘We just squatted really.  We had keys and we came in and we started 
developing and using this space. It wasn’t being used.  It’d been decommissioned as a 
youth centre...  we eventually got a licence to occupy this building, which is only 
supposed to be for a few months… eventually, I think it was almost two years after 
we got in… we got a 99-year lease’.   
 
The Council responded to the informality of squatting with informality, in that it was 
permissive about the incursion into disused space.  The important role of boundary spanners 
in realising and responding to informal practice was stressed, as the TSO officer explained: 
‘They just didn’t have the climate to shift stuff in the Council.  Then they 
brought in one of these project managers who just started moving stuff and changing 
stuff.  Since she came in, I think we completed [getting the lease] in a few months.  It 
was just such a shift.  You have the right person who you spoke to and said “get it 
done”’.  
 
Thus informality from above was evident as the Council enabled informal agencies (the 
positive model) via its signalling through the Cardiff Debate process of its willingness to take 
some risk by enrolling communities to take over assets, and its development of the ‘stepping 
up’ agenda; and also allowed informality (the permissive model) as evidenced by its response 
to the occupation and use of the fledgling community centre.  But communities need resource 
and capacity to capitalise on this positive/ permissive stance, as a TSO officer stressed: ‘it’s 
got two sides really, with that excitement and let’s put this back into the community, but… 
there’s that frustration… how are [the community] supposed to take these things forward 
without the funding, without support from the local authority?’  In this example capacity is 
embodied in a neighbourhood-based TSO that marshals community action and acts as a 
community-Council intermediary, but the TSO is significantly reliant on the Council to 
sustain via contracts (such as to manage the now-ceased CF programme) and being 
commissioned to deliver services.  Thus the Council’s permissive response to the TSO’s 
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squatting was undergirded by the leverage it could exert over the organisation if the need 
arose.    
 
By third phase interviews, TSO officers related a change in the city’s political leadership 
(personnel, not party) to a change in local state attitudes to community asset transfer, which 
reflected longstanding factional divisions within the city’s dominant Labour party: 
‘The change was this shift of the Cabinet… you had this whole struggle 
between Old and New Labour, essentially… the Cabinet now has gone back to… an 
absolute belief that stuff should be run in-house… state-run… they’re missing 
massive opportunities now in terms of the social value, the added value, that [the 
TSO] can provide’.   
 
Citizen engagement in co-producing services 
 
Citizen engagement is normatively powerful and has long been invoked on the basis that the 
knowledge and expertise of citizen-users ‘opens up new ways of doing things’ (Ines Newman 
2014, 191).  A central tenet of the CF neighbourhood initiative was that local people are best 
placed to understand their needs and, together with local service providers, consider how 
services should be improved (Welsh Government 2006).  However, the state retrenchment of 
austerity has increased the imperative for the local state to inculcate self-help practices rather 
than seek community input into service improvement.   In Cardiff, the ‘stepping up’ agenda 
incorporated community self-provision of services (Cardiff Partnership 2016) and the Cardiff 
Debate process was again used to disseminate the necessity of such practices.  By second 
phase interviews, a Council Cabinet member described increasing, if patchy, public 
recognition of the urgency of finding alternatives to former Council-provided services and 
stressed the range of community groups interested in taking services over.  A ward 
councillor, in contrast, questioned ‘how realistic it is to expect communities to take over full-
time’.  
 
‘Co-production’ was widely invoked by those interviewed, but most made clear they lacked 
understanding of the term, with a ward councillor commenting, ‘nobody is quite sure. As 
councillors we are struggling with it’.  Discourse revealed demands from below for both 
greater informality and formality on the part of the state.  A neighbourhood-based TSO 
practitioner called for greater informality from above, as ‘it’s actually [about] taking a bit of a 
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risk, releasing some funding’.   But most interviewed, including other TSOs, called for 
greater formality in terms of codification and regulation on the part of Cardiff Council and 
the Welsh Government, ‘there have to be some measures around it’, ‘it needs to be held 
accountable’.  This related to suspicions about it being a synonym for cuts, ‘the danger’, as a 
TSO officer explained, that ‘we will be simply putting people where state employees once 
were as the state rolls back’.  Here the fourth model of the local state’s response to 
informality, that of abandonment, is most pertinent, under which service provision is ceded to 
‘self-generation and social effort’ (Tonkiss 2013, 314).   
 
In practice, we identified various examples of co-production/ self-help involving the 
neighbourhood-based TSOs.  The TSOs saw their role as ensuring that informal, community 
(voluntary) groups have ‘the infrastructure needed so they can focus on running their group’, 
including assistance with managing risk (such as police checks).  One TSO gained Council 
agreement for community volunteers to work alongside Council staff in running a new 
community hub; and had also assisted community groups to provide school holiday activities 
following cuts to the Council’s youth service.  The now-formalised, formerly squatted 
community centre hosts self-help activities such as a clothes bank, community shop, food co-
op and community garden.  A TSO officer explained: 
‘If volunteers are supported in the right way, they can really do incredible 
things.  They run the food and veg co-op.  We had a paid member of staff running that 
[then the volunteers] just started doing it.  We had a bit of a gap for six months.  It’s 
[now] running really effectively’.   
 
The voluntarism of some of these community self-help examples was supported through use 
of timebanking, a ‘community currency’ which imposes equivalence on the value of people’s 
time.   Under its 'one hour equals one hour' principle, enrolled residents can earn and spend 
'timecredits' in and on voluntary-provided services (Gregory 2014).  The approach challenges 
the boundaries between formal and informal economies, drawing on the reciprocal relations 
and social capital that adhere within communities to constitute a non-monetary mode of 
exchange.  Importantly, the Council encouraged this informality by rolling out timebanking 
to all four of the TSO-managed neighbourhood CF clusters, and helped underpin this 
informal economy by allowing timecredits earned through voluntarism to be exchanged for 
Council leisure services.  But in contrast to the use of timebanking as a mechanism to engage 
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marginalised citizen-users in reflective practice with service delivery agencies (as posited by 
Ines Newman 2014, 192), in practice in Cardiff it was used to prompt self-help.   
 
As with community asset transfer, in the realm of co-production the TSOs and the voluntary 
practices they support remained extensively reliant on the underpinning provided by the local 
state to capitalise on the mix of the positive and permissive models of informality from 
above.  The change in the city’s political leadership heralded timebanking’s shift from a 
positive, actively encouraged by the local state practice (enabled by the lever of CF funding), 
to a permissive, allowed-to-occur practice to support the voluntarism of community self-
provision.  A TSO officer explained that the former Council leader and Cabinet had ‘got that 
third sector vision… now we have a Cabinet where it’s just very internal… there’s definitely 
not the appetite, as it was, to take [timebanking] forward’.  But another TSO officer clarified:  
‘Cardiff still remains quite a vibrant centre of timebanking and I think the 
Council, in quite a laissez-faire way… they’re not pushing us hard… they just see 
[timebanking] dovetailing with a lot of stuff they’re trying to achieve’.  
 
These changes in political leadership also played out in terms of the city-wide infrastructure 
of neighbourhood partnerships.  The infrastructure was retooled during the first two research 
phases in an effort to rationalise and co-ordinate the formal and informal service provision of 
public agencies, TSOs and community groups.  The role of ward councillors as community 
leaders was seemingly revalorised, with each partnership gaining a ‘lead member’ who, as a 
Cabinet member explained, ‘actually makes sure that things are happening and delivered’ by 
aligning local state and civil society efforts. In practice, a ward councillor explained they 
continued to be excluded from decision-making regarding neighbourhood service needs and 
delivery, so that whilst ‘councillors generally tend to drive their communities to accept an 
idea… it’s very difficult to do that when you’re not involved in the setting up of the 
[neighbourhood] plan to a meaningful degree’.  TSOs engaged in the partnerships 
experienced similar frustrations relating to the constrained scope for informality, citing the 
level of prescription and ‘ridiculous monitoring’.  Thus the use of neighbourhood 
partnerships as a mechanism to ostensibly engage citizens in co-production aligns with the 
third model of the local state’s proscription of informality through constraining negotiation, 
improvisation, and initiative.  By third phase research TSO officers explained that the ‘not 
functional’ neighbourhood partnership infrastructure, not regarded as a credible mode of 





As in English local authorities, in Cardiff commissioning was presented as a way of 
streamlining service provision by aligning it with need in light of the outcomes sought.   
Previous practices of grant roll-over to TSOs were switched to needs assessment and 
identification of priority areas to inform development of specifications for service 
commissioning.  As a TSO officer observed, scope for informality was constrained as the 
Council ‘are moving to a service delivery model where you only get the money for doing the 
work and it’s really tight and you’re essentially tied into their [service commissioning] 
processes’.   
 
Some TSOs saw themselves as contributing to the commissioning process, seeing it as an 
opportunity to develop services ‘with a community-grounded approach', perceived as boosted 
by the emphasis on social value, or the collective benefit to a community, of the Well-being 
of Future Generations Act (2015).  A TSO officer described the Act as ‘really radical, it’s 
absolutely ground-breaking globally’ but also recognised ‘there is so much room for 
tickboxing’.  Signs in practice thus far are mixed regarding the extent to which the Act assists 
in engendering informality from above in terms of engaging citizen-users and TSOs in 
identifying needs and service design and delivery, in part because during third phase research 
the Council was still preparing the statutory well-being plan for the city.  The dangers of 
commissioning turning into a procurement process with the Council ‘missing opportunities’ 
due to lack of wide engagement in needs-based planning and insufficient weighting of social 
value were identified by TSOs:    
‘We’re trying to push social values… for example, the well-being stuff, we 
might try and push for some clauses around… employees 70% should be local – so 
there’s different things you can do, but it’s very limited… inevitably it’s about 
price… social value, the community... that whole idea about what a community 
organisation can provide doesn’t really feature highly’.  
 
With the end of the CF initiative Cardiff Council was allocated a £550k ‘legacy fund’ by 
Welsh Government to engender community participation and engagement (Cardiff Council 
2017b), along with £1.2 million funding for employment support services.  The innovation 
the Council showed in its previous outsourcing, enabling some informality (such as 
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contracting TSOs to manage the CF initiative) is no longer in evidence, as a TSO officer 
commented: 
‘What we’ve seen in Cardiff is the local authority being forced to make budget 
cuts… legacy funding and employability [the Council] have just pulled all that back 
in-house.  There’s a good argument in terms of rationalisation… our argument… is 
that they’re losing what we can provide… that trust and that link to the community… 
it’s a tale of two worlds, of different approaches, different values.  With the best 
intentions in the world, the Council is not going to offer the same kind of care and 
support’. 
 
Again the third, proscriptive model is revealed as the local state shuts down previous 
informalities by constraining negotiation, improvisation, and initiative in commissioning 
services.  The scope to bring in wider groups of citizens, especially the ‘hard to reach’ in 
deprived communities, was drastically narrowed by the Council’s shift to retaining services 
in-house.   A TSO’s written submission (shared with us) in response to the Council’s 
tokenistic consultation on its in-sourcing of these services (Cardiff Council 2017b) stated: 
‘Where in this consultation is there an opportunity to reflect on the positive 
outcomes of CF, the services which work best, the 15 years of accumulated 
knowledge and techniques... the capacity of the organic approach used by community 
organisations to experiment with fresh approaches and introduce improvements and 
innovations in their services?... The fact that the proposals have reached this advanced 
stage without any of this collaboration is disturbing and indicative of how little 















Table 1: Local State Responses to Informality: Cardiff Community Services Provision 
 
Informality from above 
POSITIVE: creates conditions for informality PERMISSIVE: tolerates informality 
- Cardiff Debate: used to enrol communities 
into necessity of taking over assets and 
engaging in service provision, signalled Council 
risk-taking 
- Stepping Up toolkit: to assist in community 
asset transfer and service co-production  
- Cardiff Partnership: seek to co-ordinate TSO/ 
citizen and state activities via Neighbourhood 
Partnerships; leadership role for ward 
councillors  
  
- TSO squatting vacant Council-owned 
community centre (then formalised) 
- Some Council risk-tasking eg community 
volunteers working alongside Council staff; 
support for voluntarism via timebanking 
- Well-being of Future Generations Act/ well-
being plans – social value emphasis signalled 
community-grounded service design and 
delivery, openness to TSO organic approach 
Informality from below 
PROSCRIPTIVE: precludes informality ABANDONMENT: neglect hence self-generation 
- Decline in local state assistance for TSOs to 
support community asset transfer and 
voluntarism  
- Neighbourhood Partnerships: remained 
centralised, high monitoring, now moribund   
- Lack of wide engagement in needs-based 
service planning; social value insufficiently 
weighted in commissioning processes 
 
- Self-help in service delivery rather than 
‘genuine’ co-production   
- But TSO support for self-help voluntarism 
reliant on local state - recentralisation of 
community engagement and employment 
services hinders TSOs’ innovation by cutting off 
boundary spanning processes 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration of Tonkiss’ (2013) four models  
 
Table 1 sets out how the local state has sought to engender informality from above and 
responded to informality from below.  Our three-phase research reveals how opportunities for 
informality have opened up and closed down as austerity localism has progressed.  The first 
phase (2014) can be characterised as ‘preparing too late’.  Those interviewed were attempting 
to respond to the strictures of funding cuts, and state-society collaboration was seen as a way 
of combining resources to cope.  But as elsewhere, the rushed nature of cuts undermined the 
collaborative working the local state was seeking to engender.  One ward councillor 
commented ‘we should have been planning and working on our response… rather than what's 
happened is we're left to the last minute’.  Another expressed concern at the lack of 
preparation ‘because the Council wants to save money quickly’.  But importantly, the second 
phase (2015) can be characterised as one of ‘adjusting’ as changes in practice started to 
materialise in community service delivery.  Opportunities for informality opened up from 
above in a combination of the positive and permissive models, with some risk-taking, 
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facilitated by boundary spanning hybrid officers located in both community-based and city-
wide TSOs and the Council.  Ward councillors were also revealed as important actors in both 
top-down and bottom-up processes of informality.  Councillors disseminated the inevitability 
of cuts and the need for communities to ‘step up’.  But in fulfilling their boundary spanning 
role of working with their communities and with Council officers and colleagues (Ines 
Newman, 2014), some councillors displayed a more activist sensibility in how they facilitated 
informality from below, for example by working with TSOs to encourage creative forms of 
co-production and in pressing for simplified asset transfer processes.   
 
Overall across the first two phases we found signs of growing informality in community 
service delivery as local state and civil society actors became more sophisticated in 
navigating the mix of models.  Our findings affirm that in contrast to assumptions that 
everyday agency is directed against the state or developed in its absence (Hilbrandt 2019, 
354), everyday state-civil society relations are mutually constituted.  For example, 
timebanking, championed by the Council, does exemplify the contradiction of informality 
between ‘genuine’ co-production of public services by engaging citizens with service 
providers and the ‘abandonment’ of self-help.  But, as Tonkiss (2013, 323) explains, whilst ‘it 
can easily be argued that such practices are co-optative as they are complicit in austerity 
localism’s emphasis on self-managed practice… in such settings, co-optation is a condition of 
the work of these practitioners’.  TSO officers were keen to stress that they did not undertake 
their activities ‘despite [the Council].  It’s a good working relationship with Council.’  
Another emphasised that throughout the research period ‘we’ve continued to have a 
relationship with the Council and they’ve seemed to be pretty supportive of the work that we 
do’.   
 
But these signs of informality did not consolidate.  The third phase (2017) can be 
characterised as a ‘recentralising’ to the local state, wherein opportunities for informality 
were closed down as the proscriptive model emerged with its constraints on negotiation, 
improvisation and initiative. This finding, from limited third phase interview data, was 
supported by substantive documentary review (Cardiff Council 2016, 2017a, 2017b).  Efforts 
to boost ward councillors’ role as community leaders were in abeyance, along with decreased 
resource at the neighbourhood level via TSOs to support everyday practice.  TSO 
interviewees linked the recentralising of community service provision to a change in city 
political leadership.  But the imperative to recentralise is heightened as cuts continue to bite 
18 
 
and efficiencies are sought.  The turn away at the Welsh and Cardiff levels from deprived 
neighbourhood initiatives towards an upscaled, centralised mode of practice implies more 
distanced local state-society relations that undermine the everyday local state by hindering 
boundary spanning processes, as foreshadowed in other research (eg Davies and Pill 2012).   
Further state retrenchment underlines the threat of abandonment, with the relentless nature of 
the cuts outpacing the ability of emergent informal practice to enable community self-
provisioning.  It gets harder for the Council to relinquish dwindling resource to support the 
civic voluntarism sought and the city’s third sector is further weakened.  The in-sourcing of 
Welsh Government funds by the Council, despite the social value brought by community-
based TSO partners to this work, indicates an erosion of the scope for mutually constituted 
informality and the possibilities this contains.  As a TSO officer explained: 
‘The truth is… there’s just less money.  We are pitching into an ever more 
stretched environment… there’s nothing for [the Council] to pare back any more... it 
doesn’t feel to me like the system can actually take much more strain… it’s scorched 
earth stuff, because once it’s gone, to try and get it back, to try and create that diverse 
ecosystem of groups and organisations…’.    
 
We found that TSOs continue to ‘take chances when opportunities arise’ (Tonkiss 2013, 
323), but these often relate to state funding availability.  Opportunities for co-production have 
arisen through service commissioning related to health, aided by Welsh Government funding 
protections, as a Cabinet member observed, ‘how can we do it?… by working with health 
because health also very often has some funding’.  Timebanking with TSO support is being 
deployed in place-based health services, such as recovery services and informal groups 
providing services for the elderly.  But neighbourhood-based TSOs are increasingly 
experiencing financial precarity.  For example, in the final year of CF initiative operation, 
one was receiving nearly 70% of its funding from the initiative, despite efforts to diversify 
and self-generate funding sources via social enterprise approaches.  Another TSO commented 
that ‘the money available to grassroots and third sector is dwindling and the support available 
around things like governance, around funding… it’s not there as it once was’.  In seeking to 
sustain, TSOs are calling for support to develop their governance structures, financial and 
project management processes so they can cope with a wider set of projects and enterprises.  
Such calls align with the need for the state to initiate and help sustain civic infrastructure and 
capacity at the neighbourhood scale, as stressed by Wills (2016) in her seminal book on 
localism in England.  A way of providing greater security and stability for civic infrastructure 
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would commence via the positive informality of community asset transfer.  But to circumvent 
the contradiction of temporary use/ insecurity, such transfer should then be institutionalised 
with establishment of formal entities such as community development trusts, the public 
accountability of which could be secured via engagement of ward councillors in a community 
leadership role (Ines Newman 2014; Copus and Wall 2017).   
 
Such calls for formality from below point to a limitation of Tonkiss’ models, which bring the 
state’s top-down role in engendering informality to the fore, but do not consider civil 
society’s bottom-up role in seeking the formalisation, or institutionalisation, of informal 
practice as part of efforts to sustain activities.  Our findings underline that local state and civil 
society actors seek to engender and respond to both formality and informality, further 
breaking down associations of the formal with the state and the informal with citizen activity.  
Bottom-up calls for greater formality stress its important perceived role in bringing about, if 
not guaranteeing, social change.  Our case of Cardiff’s community services emphasises the 
scope for mutually constituted informal practices developed between the local state and TSOs 
to achieve change, but we cannot draw conclusions about whether these would become 
durable by becoming formal.  What is clear is that the formal/ informal analytical frame 
finegrains understanding of transitions in state-society relations through its emphasis on 




Deploying the lens of informality enhances understanding of the changing but continually 
mutually constitutive nature of state and civil society in the operations of the ‘everyday local 
state’ under austerity.  In UK cities, Tonkiss (2013, 314) argues that the models of 
proscription and abandonment are ‘high in the mix’ as budget cuts ‘tend to outrun any 
substantive efforts by city governments to more positively promote alternative urban 
strategies and solutions’.  Following second phase research in Cardiff, this assessment was 
open to question given the opening up of informalities from above.  But the third phase saw 
the closing down of community engagement and initiative, due to upscaling from the 
neighbourhood and the centralising of service provision.  And thus the prospect of the fourth, 
abandonment model is now more immediate in the city.  Such distancing between the local 
state and civil society narrows opportunities for boundary spanning and hybridity with the 
stitching of civil society practices into new modes of local service delivery (Lowndes and 
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McCaughie 2013, 544), leaving communities to the prospect of more laissez-faire approaches 
and practices.  Thus despite important distinctions between Wales and England, including a 
policy discourse which continues to focus on poverty reduction, practices reveal that as in 
England, austerity localism does not engage with inequalities (Featherstone et al. 2012) and 
encourages centralisation.  Creative practices of community service provision likely will 
continue to evolve but without the concerted underpinning provided in the early stages of 
cuts, these will become ever more vulnerable to the contradictions of informality, with their 
attendant challenges of insecurity and precarity, which have resulted in calls for formality 
from below.   
 
In practice, both sides of (local) state-society relations have used their boundary spanning 
capacities to open up the opportunities of informality and navigate its contradictions.  But 
latterly, the remorseless nature of funding cuts has acted to close down informality as the 
local state has centralised, withdrawing from work at the boundaries and widening the gap 
between the state and society.  Over the research timeline 2014-2017, it thus could be said 
that ‘austerian realism’ (Davies and Blanco 2017, 1524) has prevailed.  But we also identified 
moments of opportunity to resist austerity and forge alternative pathways through the 
mutually constitutive operations of the everyday local state.  In their work with the local 
state, TSOs were arguably co-opted into implementing austerity, but the practices which 
resulted (such as voluntarism) also provide resources of solidarity and collective action which 
could have, and could still, be deployed in ways that challenge austerity through the operation 
of civil society in constituting the everyday local state.  For example, the city’s experience of 
timebanking points to it being a potentially transformative form of co-production which 
merits further research into its operation in other localities.  The research findings are of 
relevance beyond Wales as they aid understanding of local variegation in ways of coping 
with austerity, further problematising totalising claims about neoliberalism (Davies and 
Blanco 2017; Davies 2017).  Our research approach, which derives from scholarship which 
brings Global South understandings of everyday, ‘making do’ practice to the (ostensibly 
formal) Global North (Iveson et al. 2018, 2) adds to this literature by providing a formal/ 
informal analytical frame for research into the changing dynamics of local practice.  Our 
analysis underlines that this frame should include civil society calls for formality ‘from 
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